We want to do the best work possible for our clients, make sure our people are well-paid, and see our stockholders make money. None of that has anything to do with size.
I. INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to answer a simple question: how important are economies of scale in advertising agency operations? Advertising agencies, like most other businesses, are multiple-product firms. An agency's costs may depend on how their clients allocate their advertising budgets across media and there is considerable variation in media mix among agencies. (SectionII provides some quantitative information on this variation.) Accordingly, we use nonlinear estimation techniques to examine the influences of both scale and media mix on advertising agency costs.
We find evidence that scale economies may not be as important as many have argued and that media mix is. a significant determinant of costs. Differences in media mix between large and small agencies seem typically to lower the costs of the former relative to the latter even if all economies of scale have been exhausted.
The question of scale economies underlies a number of current and longstanding controversies related to advertising agency operations. First, the ability to exploit economies of scale is often given as a rationale for agency mergers. However, much skepticism has also been expressed about the realization of such an advantage through mergers and acquisitions (Kanner 1979) and the Federal Trade Commission reportedly did not view several mergers involving large agencies as serious threats to competition (Gordon 1979) .
Secondly, the issue of economies of scale underlies the problem of designing an equitable agency compensation scheme (Calantone and Drury 1979, Gross 1972 ).
Both agencies and clients have voiced dissatsifaction with the traditional agency compensation arrangement, wherein the agency's fee is a fixed percentage, typically 15 percent, of the client's gross spending on advertising media (Booz, Allen & Hamilton 1965, Frey and Davis 1958) . This dissatisfaction is usually based on the perception of economies of scale at least with respect to account size: agencies complain that they are underpaid by small accounts, and clients are suspicious of being overcharged for large campaigns. Still, the most recent study bearing on this issue conducted by the Association of National Advertisers (1979) found that the commission system continues to be the dominant method of compensation with 57 percent of the 236 advertisers surveyed reporting they utilized media commissions plus markups-on production costs,' while.
another 18 percent employed a combination of commissions and fees. Finally, evidence on scale economies might contribute to a satisfactory explanation of the limited incidence of "in-house" as opposed to "independent" agencies. 2 Advertising agency cost structures are also of interest to specialists in industrial organization. The importance of scale economies in advertising 3 generally has been much debated in the literature.
Any such economies must reflect both the nature of consumer response to advertising messages and the cost of delivering those messages. Advertising agency fees are a part of this cost from the advertiser's point of view, while the agency's costs represent part of the social cost involved. Even ignoring the advertising debate, advertising agencies are highly visible multiple-product firms engaged in what sometimes appears to be intense competition. The implications of cost conditions for the nature of market interaction in such a setting merits study in its own right.
III
Despite the relevance of information on advertising agency coststructures to a broad range of important questions, there are no published econometric studies of the effects of scale and media mix on agency costs.
Section II discusses the data we employ to study those effects, and Section III presents the cost function specifications we estimate. Section IV describes our empirical results which are further discussed in Section V. Section VI summarizes the conclusions and implications we draw from them.
II. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA BASE DESCRIPTION
The variables and measures used in the analysis reported below are The unit of analysis throughout is an individual agency.
Gross Income (Y). An agency's gross income represents its "sales receipts minus cost of goods sold" and is the sum of revenues obtained from three sources: (1) commissions earned from purchases of media time and space made on behalf of clients; (2) markups on materials and services purchased from "outside" suppliers and charged to clients; and (3) fees paid by clients for agency services as an addition to or in lieu of commissions and markups. Gross income is generally accepted in the advertising (Marshall 1981) .
The latter percentage has remained stable over time (Marshall 1981 ) and appears to vary little with agency size cross-sectionally (Edwards 1973) . However, there is only sparce evidence to be found in published.sources on the crosssectional variation in payroll expense. 5 Thus while the ratio of employees to gross income is clearly not an ideal measure of unit cost, it is the best proxy available to us. We have no reason to suspect that its use will introduce substantial bias here. 7
Share of Billings by Media Category (S.) Agencies generally create, produce, and place advertising in several different media, and variations in the media mix their clients employ are a likely source of inter-agency cost differentials. As an indication of the composition of an agency's output, we use the share of its total billings to clients associated with each of the ten categories listed below in Table 1 . An agency t s total billings to its clients consists of charges for media time and space, for other materials and services purchased from outside suppliers, and for services performed within the agency, inclusive of all commissions, markups, and fees. The "Other" category in Table 1 thus covers a diverse.set of non-media-related activities:
its composition varies from agency to agency according to the nature of specialized services each performs. Examples of services typically included in the "Other" category are public relations, new product development, sales promotion, and marketing research.
In the analysis that follows, we treat the shares of an agency's billings in each media category as unbiased measures of the shares of its gross income attributable to those media. (In other contexts, this would correspond roughly to treating shares of "sales" as measures of shares of "sales minus costs of goods sold".) This is strictly valid only if the ratio of gross income to billings is constant for all media within each agency. Unfortunately, the information required to check this condition directly is not available in our data base, and we have been unable to find other relevant evidence in any published sources. Industry sources do indicate that the commission rate allowed agencies on space and time purchases varies little by medium, the standard being 15 percent. However, two other pieces of evidence combine to suggest that the ratio of gross income to billings for. at least some media may vary systematically with agency size. First, the importance of media
commissions as a source of gross income tends to increase as agency gross income increases In addition to the 1967 Census results noted above, the American Association of Advertising Agencies, which regularly surveys its membership on their compensation practices, reports that the ratio of gross income to billings decreases from 30 percent in the "smallest" agencies to 15 percent in the "largest agencies" (Paster, 1981) . Second, as is discussed below, we find evidence of weak cross-sectional relationships between media share of billings and agency gross income for three of the ten media categories studied. These two bits of evidence suggest that some systematic errors may arise from using a medium's share of billings as a proxy for that medium's share of gross income, but they do not permit us to assess the likely importance of such errors.. We return to this problem in the discussion of our statistical results and their implications below. Information on the S, the 1977 media shares, is provided in Table 1 .
The second and third columns give some indication of the relative importance of the different media to the agencies in our sample. Note that the first four media account for 70 percent of the gross income of an average agency (column 2) and 85 percent of the aggregate gross income in our sample (column 3)0 The difference between these two figures indicates that there is a tendency for these four.media to be more important, on average, for larger than for smaller agencies. The first four media listed in Table 1 (and in all subsequent tables) are referred to as major media in what follows; the others are labeled minor media. In order to explore variations in media mix with size, we regress share for each media category (S.) on the natural logarithm of gross income (Y)e
The slope coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics are given in the fourth column of Table 1 . On average, the larger an agency, the larger the share of revenue received from television advertising, and the smaller the share of newspaper and radio advertising, with declines in the relative importance of direct mail and farm publications also likely. None of these regressions has an R above 0.12. There is thus considerable variation in media mix that is unrelated to agency size.
The last two columns in Table 1 give some feel for the extent of variation in media shares. While nine agencies report no billings from magazine advertising, for instance, one agency reports no billings from any other source! Note in particular the large numbers of agencies reporting no billings from the less important media. Without aggregation over these media, this limits the precision with which we can expect to estimate coefficients that relate to them. However, we have no a priori information that permits us to aggregate with any confidence. Indeed, since, for example, spot and network television differ in certain respects (Porter, 1976) , we would elect to disaggregate further if it were possible to do so.
Our use of cross-section data to estimate a long-run cost function requires some discussion. Because advertising agencies employ relatively little firmspecific capital and their employment levels are notoriously flexible, deviations from long-run equilibrium in any single year should be relatively minor. Thus Friedman's (1955) classic critique' of this approach has relatively little force in this case. Since price competition is apparently relatively III unimportant in this industry, it seems sensible to model agencies as minimizing the cost of meeting the exogenoutsly-determined demand for their services.
Given product differentiation and the importance of regional markets, at least for some agencies, a cross-section sample such as ours can be expected to contain a range of equilibrium firm sizes and media mixes. Finally, it
should be noted that with no available data on input and output prices, there is no obvious way to use the profit-maximization or cost-minimization assumption to improve. estimation efficiency.
III. COST FUNCTION SPECIFICATION
Suppose, for the moment, that we are dealing with a single-product industry and are concerned with estimation of the importance of scale economies. A reasonable specification would then be the following:
where U is a measure of average cost (as here), Z is a scale-related variable, and t, 6, and y are positive constants.
This function is illustrated in Figure 1 . Its shape is broadly consistent with the empirical literature on economies of scale in many industries. 2 A quadratic specification would also involve only three parameters, but if it implied declining average costs at small scale, it would also imply either that U is negative at very large scales or that U is increasing after some point, and neither 13 implication is plausible.
If U were a log-linear function of Z and scale economies were estimated, it would follow that U approached zero for large Z, which is also implausible. 1 4 Thus, even though equation (1) requires nonlinear estimation, it seems more sensible than the obvious alternatives.
Insert Figure 1 Here
Equation (1) implies that U is an everywhere decreasing function of Z, so there is no finite Z at which scale economies are completely exhausted.
Once U is near its asymptotic value, a, however, further increases in scale are of no quantitative importance. We can thus say that scale economies are essentially exhausted for a firm of size Z* if U(Z*) (+g) , where is a small number. Solving for Z*, we obtain an indicator of minimum efficient scale:
In what follows we us e 0.01, so that a scale of Z* corresponds to costs one percent above the asymptotic minimum. Another measure of the importance of scale economies is the cost penalty incurred by firms operating at inefficiently small scales. If a firm's scale is kZ*, where 0 < k < 1, its cost disadvantage relative to a firm of scale Z* is given by
In what follows, we set k = 1/2 in order to permit comparability with similar estimates for other industries? 5 The determination of Z* and D* is illustrated in Figure . Now suppose a firm produces N products and that equation (1), with j subscripts everywhere, refers to the unit cost of the jth product. Multiplying by Sj and summing, we obtain our basic equation for long-run
Depending on the details of the technology involved, the Z might be complex functions of all output levels.
III
Since we had 10 "products" (media) here and only 91 observations, we could not hope to obtain unrestricted estimates of the cost complementarities 16 or economies of scope that might be present.
Instead, we investigated two relatively simple polar case specifications of the way an agency's output levels interact to determine its average cost. We did not begin with a prior assumption that one or the other must be the true specification. Rather, our view was that these specifications bracket the truth. If the specification tests described in Section IV below were to reject one of them, the other might sensibly be treated as a good approximation to the true specification. If not, our assumption was that they bracket the truth in such a way that qualitative statements supported by both are likely to be correct.
The first polar case assumes essentially that scale economies arise in those agency activities, like client contact and concept development, that are essentially independent of media mix allocations. Under that assumption, the most plausible scale variable for all products" is the overall size of the agency, measured here by gross income, Y. Considering natural restrictions on the parameters in (4), we obtain a set of five partially nested models: 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The nonlinear least-squares routine in the TROLL system at MIT was employed to obtain parameter estimates for these 10 long-run average cost of what seems to be a close analog of the multicollinearity problem in ordinary least squares, we thus cannot be absolutely certain that we have found the global minimum sums of squared residuals for these models° This same problem was even more severe for models 1.5 and 11.5, and considerable experimentation was required to obtain even one well-behaved local minimum for each. The program was unable even to compute an estimated covariance matrix for model 1.5. We suspect that at least one reason for these computational difficulties was the large number of zero values for the S in this sample. (See Table 1 .)
We employed F-tests within Models I and II to select specifications for 17 further study.
The results of thoses tests are shown in Figure 2o The Insert Figure 3 Here
A comparison of R s suggests that it may be more appropriate to restrict the y's (models Io3 and I1.3) than to restrict the i's (models 1.4 and II.4), though the differences are slight. Similarly, differences in the explanatory power of the assumptions that scale effects relate to agency size (Model I) and that they relate to media-specific income (Model II) are slight. In an attempt to shed more light on these issues, we used the P-test for specification recently proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) . 18 In this test, one rejects the null hypothesis that any particular model is correctly specified if the fitted values from any other model significantly enhance its explanatory power. Results are shown in Figure 3: arrows point away from models being tested and toward the models used to generate fitted values, and the numbers next to arrows give the significance levels (expressed as percentages) at which the null hypothesis of correct specification is rejected. 9 All specifications except model 1.4, which has the least explanatory power, are rejected at least once at conventional significance levels. This is at least consistent with our prior belief that none of these are likely to be the correct model,.but the pattern of results does not seem to provide much additional information.
In short, the data do not permit us to drop either Model I or Model II as distinctly inferior to the other. We are thus unable to say anything about the appropriate scale variable or, more generally, about the way outputs interact to determine cost. Accordingly, we concentrate on inferences consistent with all four sets of estimates. -16- to the pattern of differences among media. The substantial difference between the limiting costs associated with newspapers and television is of particular interest and is discussed further below. The differences among the minor media (compare business and farm publications in particular) would seem to confirm our fear that aggregation might be misleading.
Insert Table 2 Near Here Inspection of the estimated B's and ys from our four specifications does not provide much information about the importance of scale economies.
Accordingly, we present instead estimates of the Z* and D* statistics 21 developed in Section 3, along'with their asymptotic standard errors.21 Table 3 gives the estimates of Z*, minimum efficient agency gross income, from Model I. As before, we summarize with precision-weighted means. In order to permit comparisons with the results from Model II, these means are translated into media incomes using the mean shares given in Y as the scale variable for medium j, are given in Table 4 .
Insert Tables 3 & 4 Near Here -----------------r··r·rr-· ------------r
All specifications indicate that scale economies in the four major media are essentially exhausted by agencies with gross incomes of less than a million dollars. (A gross income of $1 million corresponds to total billings of about $6.7 million.) Advertising Ag e (1978) reports that 240 agencies had gross incomes above a million dollars in 1977 and thus had very likely exhausted all scale economies associated with the four most important media.
Because of the tendency of large agencies to have disproportionately more television-related income than small agencies, one might expect television to show especially important economies of scale. But the results in Tables 3   and 4 are not consistent with this expectation.n The Z*'s for television, general magazines, and newspapers cannot be confidently ordered on the basis of our results. It appears that any scale economies associated with radio are exhausted at very small output levels, and there is reason to doubt (see models 1.3 and II.3) that any such economies exist.
The Model I estimates in Table 3 show exhaustion of scale economies at small agency size for the minor media as well as for the major media. The minor-media statistics from Model II, which are much less reliable because of the large number of incorrectly-signed estimates, are somewhat more suggestive of the possibility of non-trivial economies of scale. Such economies would be consistent, at least, with. the large number of agencies receiving no income at all from each of the minor media. (See Table 1 .)
But this same fact makes these estimates particularly unreliable. In any case, only one Model II estimate in Table 4 implies that an agency would need to have much over a million dollars in gross income, on average, in order to exhaust all economies of scale. The results in Tables 3 and 4 do not permit one to compare Z*'s among the minor media with any confidence.
Even though economies of scale appear to be relatively unimportant in the sense that many (over 200) U.S. advertising agencies are apparently large enough to have exhausted them, it does not follow that very small agencies do not operate under significant scale-related cost disadvantages. Table 5 presents estimates of D*, the cost penalty borne as a consequence of operating at one-half minimum efficient scale (Z*), for each medium from our four models. On the whole, these estimated penalties are substantial in absolute terms and large relative to similar estimates in the literature for other industries. Because the S are imperfect measures of gross income shares, and the j reflect those imperfections, theestimated differences amongmedia shown in Tables 2 -5 must be interpreted with caution, If, for some medium, the ratio of S to the corresponding share of gross income is negatively correlated with agency size, the increase in Y with agency size will be understated, and scale economies will tend to be underestimated as well. 2 5 If this happens for some media, however, t follows that scale economies associated with other media will be understated on average. Since we find that scale economies for all media are essentially exhausted at gross incomes of around a million dollars, systematic errors in the S are unlikely to have biased our overall ci~ ~ ~ ~~2
conclusions regarding minimum efficient agency sizes. 2 6 Similarly, one must treat differences in the D* estimates in Table 5 with caution, but the general pattern of substantial cost penalties for small-scale operation is unlikley to be affected by measurement problems with the S. V Insert Our medium-specific cost function estimates do not suggest a satisfactory explanation of scale-related changes in media billing shares. The conputations described in the preceeding paragraph are dominated by the effects of a general rise in the share of television and a general fall in the share of newspapers as agency size increases, But we do not find scale economies in television to be more important than those associated with newspaper advertising, so it is not clear that large agencies do more television because they have a comparative cost advantage in that medium.
A tentative explanation of these scale-related differences in media mix and unit cost is suggested by Porter's (1976) discussion of differences among media. Briefly, Porter argues that the size of the "effective threshold," the minimum level of advertising expenditure required, varies by medium because of differences in their "divisibility" with respect to the size and characteristics of the audiences they reach. National media, such as network television, are highly indivisible and thus useable mainly by large, national advertisers. At the other extreme, newspapers are highly divisible because their audiences are confined to small geographic areas, and their correspondingly low effective thresholds make them attractive to small advertisers.
Other media fall somewhere between these extremes, If larger advertisers use less divisible media, agency media mixes should reflect the sizes of their clients' advertising budgets.
To pursue these ideas, we obtained a count of the number of accounts served by 87 f the 91 agencies in our sample. Table 6 shows the results of regressing each of the S on the logarithm of gross income per account (Y/A) for each agencye For only two media, television and general magazines, do we find that increases in mean account size are associated with increases in the corresponding share of billings, and the coefficient for general magazines is insignificant. For the remaining six categories, for which billings share was negatively related to mean account size, three of the corresponding coefficients (those for newspapers, radio, and business publications) are significant at the 10% level or beyond. These patterns seem quite consistent with Porter's arguments about effective thresholds and divisibility.
Insert Table 6 Here
These results suggest that size-related differences in agencies' media mixes may be determined more by size-related differences in client characteristics than by any advantage arising from economies of scale. Larger agencies tend to serve advertisers who compete in large geographically extensive markets and who accordingly make heavy use of national media such as network television and general magazines. In contrast, small agencies primarily serve firms that operate in markets of more limited scope and that efficiently spend their smaller budgets in local or specialized media such as newspapers, radio, and business publications. One would expect agencies considered to be especially effective, for reasons unrelated to scale economies, to attract large clients and thus grow large themselves. Large clients should be willing to pay a premium to deal with such agencies, and those premia may show up here as scale-related unit cost declines generated by media mix effects° Another important factor at work here is the industry norm of.
an agency not serving competing accounts --i.e., products/services that compete directly with one another. We hasten to add that our evidence for the above explanation is less than conclusive. Better tests might be obtained if we could distinguish between network and spot shares for radio and television and between national and regional shares for magazines.
.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
To our knowledge, this is the first econometric study of advertising agency cost functions. Clearly, there is more useful work to be done here.
Data limitations constrained our choice of specifications and made it impossible for us to reach any conclusions on a number of questions. In particular, we were not able to learn anything about the way in which agencies' media mixes (or levels of output of advertising in the various media) interact with overall scale to determine unit costs, and our results on medium-specific scale effects must be treated with caution. Our two extreme models seem roughly equally consistent with the data. We encountered multicollinearity-like computational problems and obtained generally imprecise paramater estimates for the minor media. Availability of data from the American Association of Advertising Agencies' annual studies would likely permit some of these prob-28 lems to be overccone. for the presence of media mix effects. Moreover, the asymptotic unit cost estimates in Table 2 do not differ noticeably among alternative specifications that should be affected differently by the media share measurement problem, and they are generally consistent with the impressions of industry observers.
Finally, larger agencies tend to derive larger shares of their billings from media with lower unit costs than do smaller agencies. Further examination of this matter led us to suggest that size-related differences in agencies' media mixes are more a reflection of size-related differences in clientele served than a consequence of any cost advantage arising from economies of scale.
These conclusions have implications for a number of the controversies discussed in the introduction. First, our results suggest that, contrary to a good deal of discussion in the trade press, mergers among the top 200 or so U.S. agencies are unlikely to yield efficiency gains based on scale economies. Second, if all scale economies were account-specific, our estimates suggest that up to billings of around $6.7 million in 1977 dollars, large accounts would be cheaper to handle than small accounts on average, Our data do not permit us to say anything about the plausibility of this conjecture. Third, economies of scale do not seem sufficient to explain the low incidence of "in-house" advertising agencies. Model I implies that firms spending more than $7 million on advertising (in 977 dollars) should be able to operate fuily-efficient in-house agencies, though firms with substantially smaller budgets would have substantially higher costs.
Model II implies that even firms with budgets well below $7 million concentrated in a few media can fully exploit available scale economies.
Fourth, scale economies in advertising agencies do not seem sufficiently important to be a major source of economically significant scale economies in advertising generally. Finally, the analysis of Section v provides some clues about the nature of competitive interactions among agencies, though the picture that emerges there must be regarded more as an attractive hypothesis than as a definite conclusion. Bojanek (1980) presents a history of agency merger activity and an analysis of publicly-stated rationales for agency mergers. See also Berstein (1979) and Zeltner (1979) 2. Sethi (1975) provides background and analysis.
3.
For a survey, see Comanor and Wilson (1979 7. In particular, conversations with industry participants do not suggest a tendency for cost/employee to vary systematically with media mix.
8. We are indebted to Crain Communications, Inc. for permission to use these copyrighted data which appeared in the March 13, 1978 issue of Advertising Age.
9. Details pertaining to how these agencies were selected are not reported.
Mention is made of the fact that "more than 125 agencies" returned questionnaires that were incomplete and therefore were excluded from the listing (O'Gara 1978, p. 38 it is clearly inappropriate to treat these estimates as independent, however, so that the precision-weighted average serves here merely as a convenient summary statistic that reflects estimation precision in a natural way.
21. The latter were computed following the (standard) procedure clearly described by Goldberger (1964, pp. 122-5) .
22. All the precision-weighted means in Table 4 are below the corresponding mean Yj's except for outdoor media,direct mail, and farm publications. 24. See, for instance, Scherer (1980, pp. 96-7) .
25. Recalling the discussion in Section II, since television s share of billings tends to increase with agency size, while the ratio of billings to gross income decline with size, this sort of underestimation is most likely for television.' Conversations with industry observers lead us to expect that disaggregation of the television share into network and spot components would likely reveal significant scale economies associated with network television advertising, along with a lower than we find for television as a whole.
26. It is worth noting that Model I.1, which does not employ the S or the Y.
in any fashion, produces an estimated Z* of $.932 million. A comparison with the estimates in Table 3 suggests that this figure, which supports our overall conclusions about minimum efficient scale, is too large because it confounds media mix and scale effects.
27, See footnote 6. Table 3 MINIMUM EFFICIENT AGENCY SIZES (Z*): MODEL I* * Estimated agency gross income, in millions of dollars, at which medium specific unit cost is 1% over its limiting value, computed using eq. (2) with = 0.01. Figures in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
t Computed as in Table 2 * Precision-weighted means multiplied by mean media share from different froma zeroat 10% (a), 5% (b), and 1 (c) levels (2-tailed test).
